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Abstract—Along with the miniaturization of various types of
sensors, a mass of intelligent terminals are gaining stronger
sensing capability, which raises a deeper perception and better
prospect of Internet of Things (IoT). With big sensing data,
IoT provides lots of convenient services for the monitoring and
management of smart cities and people’s daily lives. However,
there are still many security challenges influencing the further
development of IoT, one of which is how to quickly verify
the big data obtained from IoT terminals. Aggregate signature
is an efficient approach to perform big data authentication.
It can effectively reduce the computation and communication
overheads. In this paper, utilizing these features, we construct a
verifiable data aggregation scheme for Internet of Things, named
VDAS, based on an improved certificateless aggregate signature
algorithm. In VDAS, the length of the aggregated authentication
message is independent of the number of IoT terminals. Then,
we prove that VDAS is existentially unforgeable under adaptive
chosen message attacks assuming that the computational Diffie-
Hellman problem is hard. Additionally, the proposed VDAS
achieves a better trade-off on the computation overheads between
the resource-constrained IoT terminals and the data center.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, as the traditional Internet is merging with different
kinds of wired/wireless networks, Internet of Things (IoT) has
attracted the attention worldwide by enabling things-to-things
and things-to-people communications. IoT can be widely used
in ubiquitous applications of smart cities, including smart
building, smart grid, public transportation, health-care, etc.
With the latest advances on a diversity of sensors integrated
in the intelligent terminals, IoT has opened new opportunities
for the development of various industries to improve people’s
daily lives.
We have seen a vast amount of works on every aspect in
the IoT systems [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], including
the reliability, flexibility, robustness, and security of IoT, to
make environmental conditions more controllable, convenient,
and safe. To better understand IoT, three reference models
have been wildly discussed: three-level model [4], five-level
model [5], and seven-level model [6]. The seven-level model
was proposed by CISCO in 2014, as shown in Fig. 1, and is
broadly accepted by industry and academia.
Nowadays, IoT has been playing an important role of bridg-
ing the physical world and the digital world. By integrating
all relevant technologies together (such as computer networks,
wireless sensor networks, cellular networks, etc.), IoT allows
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Fig. 1. Seven-level reference model
people and things to be connected with each other anytime,
anywhere. For the intrinsic features of IoT-based applications,
IoT has raised lots of new security challenges [1], including:
a. correctly sensing the environment; b. securely exchanging
the information; c. safeguarding the private information. Addi-
tionally, based on CISCO’s seven-level reference model, Nia
and Jha summarized the security threats and corresponding
countermeasures in IoT, level by level [2]. Lots of efforts were
focused only on the lightweight security solution in the three
lower levels [9], [10], [11]. Moreover, a massive amount of
IoT applications in smart cities neglect to verify the obtained
data, especially when huge amount of data are generated by a
large scale of devices. The protection and verification of the
huge of IoT data must be taken into consideration [12], [13].
Aggregate Signature (AS) is an efficient approach to batch
verification of massive data in IoT and raises a better prospect
of IoT.
The concept of aggregate signature was first introduced by
Boneh et al. [14] in Eurocrypt 2003. This kind of digital
signature can aggregate n signatures on n distinct messages
from n individual users into a single signature, which al-
lows the aggregator to easily verify that the n users have
indeed signed the n original messages. Since the scheme can
greatly reduce the total signature length and the verification
overhead, it is very useful especially in the environments
with low communication bandwidth, low storage and low
computing power. The typical applications include wireless
sensor networks, vehicular communications and some other
IoT scenarios. Taking advantages of these merits, many AS
schemes based on the Traditional Public Key Cryptosystem
(TPKC), ID-based Public Key Cryptosystem (ID-PKC) and
Certificateless Public Key Cryptosystem (CL-PKC) have been
proposed for various applications in practical circumstances.
In 2004, Cheon et al. [15] introduced the first identity-based
aggregate signature. Soon after, many certificateless aggregate
signature (CL-AS) schemes [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21],
[22], [23], [24] were proposed respectively, due to CL-PKC’s
resistance to the key escrow problem in ID-PKC. In [16],
the authors proposed a CL-AS scheme that requires only four
pairing computations for aggregate verification and two group
elements in signature size, but it fails to provide unforgeability.
In [17], the authors proposed an efficient CL-AS scheme
with better performance than the previous schemes [18], [24].
Unfortunately, this scheme was proved to be vulnerable to the
attack launched by a Type II adversary in [25].
In this paper, based on an improved CL-AS algorithm,
we propose an efficient verifiable data aggregation scheme
for IoT, named VDAS. It effectively reduces the computation
overhead in IoT data center. Additionally, the proposed VDAS
is proved to be secure assuming that the computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) problem is hard. The length of the aggregated
authentication message in VDAS is only two group elements,
and is independent of the number of signers. Moreover, VDAS
achieves a lower computation overhead in the individual
signing phase and aggregate verification phase, which is more
compatible and preferred by the resource-limited IoT terminal
devices and the data center.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we briefly introduce some preliminaries including pairing, the
computational assumption, and the security model. In section
III, we first describe VDAS in detail, and then formally analyze
its security. In section IV, the performance is evaluated.
Finally, the conclusion is given in section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
To facilitate the understanding of the cryptogram essential,
we introduce the basic definitions and the properties of bilinear
pairings over elliptic curve group. We also give the security
model for VDAS.
A. Bilinear Pairings
Definition 1. Bilinear Pairings map: G1 and G2 are the cycle
additive group and cycle multiplicative group of prime order
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Fig. 2. The network architecture of VDAS
q respectively. P is a generator of G1. A bilinear pairing is a
map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 , it satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For any P , Q ∈ G1, random number a, b ∈
Z∗q , we have e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)
ab;
• Non-degeneracy: There exists P , Q ∈ G1, such that
e(P,Q) 6= 1;
• Computability: There exists an efficient polynomial time
algorithm to compute e(P,Q), for any P , Q ∈ G1;
Definition 2. computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem:
G1 is a cycle additive group of prime order q, P is the
generator of G1, for any a, b ∈ Z
∗
q , given an instance
〈P, aP, bP 〉, compute abP ∈ G1.
B. Security Model
In general, a CL-AS scheme contains six algorithms: Setup,
Partial-Private-Key-Extract,UserKeyGen, Sign, Aggregate and
Aggregate Verify. There are two types of attackers in CL-AS:
AI and AII . AI is able to replace any user’s public key,
while AII could be an honest-but-curious Key Generation
Center (KGC) who holds the master-key but is unable to
perform public key replacement attack. To prove the secu-
rity of VDAS based on CL-AS, we adopt the existential
unforgeability under the adaptive-chosen-message attacks and
adaptive-chosen-identity attacks model in [26] for both types
of adversaries. There is no probabilistic polynomial time
adversary, no matter AI or AII , could win the game with
non-negligible probability.
III. AN EFFICIENT VERIFIABLE DATA AGGREGATION
SCHEME FOR IOT
As IoT is becoming more autonomous in smart cities, a
key challenge for IoT towards smart city applications is how
to make sure a large amount of data indeed come from the
legitimate devices. Once the IoT data center gathers huge
amount of data in real time, it may not be able to efficiently
verify the collected data.
A. Design Objectives
On account of the heavy burdens for the verification of
a mass of gathered data in IoT scenarios, we propose an
efficient verifiable data aggregation scheme that can reduce
the computation overhead for the IoT data center. Deploying
an improved CL-AS as the cryptogram essential, our scheme
provides batch authentication of the collected data. In VDAS,
there are three types of entities involved, as shown in Fig.
2: n IoT terminals, a Key Generation Center (KGC), and a
IoT data center (as the aggregator). In general, we assume
that all three kinds of entities can run relevant public key
cryptographic operations. This implies the existence of some
authority mechanisms, such as the KGC can generate and
certify the cryptographic keys. The IoT terminal devices, as
well as the data center, must contact the KGC in advance for
key distribution.
B. Verifiable Data Aggregation Scheme for IoT
In this section, we will describe the proposed VDAS in de-
tail, which consists of four stages: System Setup, Registration,
Individual Signing, and Aggregate Verification. To enhance the
security of the scheme, we introduce a state information ∆ as
defined in [18], [19], which is a stochastic-length bit string
selected randomly by terminals and broadcasted before the
signing phase. One can choose the current time, some parts of
the system parameters or other feasible information to generate
the ∆. The specification of the scheme is as follows:
1) System Setup: Given a security parameter l, the KGC
chooses a cyclic additive group (G1,+) which is gen-
erated by P with prime order q(q > 2l), a cyclic
multiplicative group (G2, ·) of the same order, and a
bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2. The KGC also selects
two cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → G1,
h2 : {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗q . Then, it picks a random s ∈ Z
∗
q as
the master-key and accordingly sets P0 = sP . The system
parameters are Param = {G1, G2, e, q, P, P0,H1, h2}
and the data space is data ∈ {0, 1}∗. Eventually, the
KGC publishes Param while keeping the master-key in
secret.
2) Registration: Upon receiving a registration request from a
terminal i, KGC first confirms the identity IDi ∈ {0, 1}
∗.
Then, it computes Qi = H1(IDi) and generates the
partial private key Di = sQi for the terminal. The
terminal also generates a random xi ∈ Z
∗
q as its secret
value, computes Pi = xiP , and sets Pi as its public
key, 〈xi, Di〉 as its private key. Finally, KGC sends
〈IDi, Qi, Pi〉 to the data center.
3) Individual Signing: Based on the common state informa-
tion ∆, the terminal i, whose identity is IDi and the
corresponding public key is Pi, signs a requested datai
with its private key 〈xi, Di〉 as follows:
– Choose a random ri ∈ Z
∗
q , then compute Ri = riP ,
hi = h2(datai ‖ ∆ ‖ IDi), and gi = h2(datai ‖
∆ ‖ Pi);
– Compute Vi = giDi + (xihi + ri)U , in which U =
H1(∆ ‖ P0);
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Fig. 3. Verifiable data aggregation
– Upload σi = (Ri, Vi) as the signature on datai to
the data center.
4) Aggregate Verification: Upon receiving a large num-
ber of data needed to be verified, the aggrega-
tor, that is the data center, aggregates a collection
of individual signatures under the same state infor-
mation ∆. For n terminals with identities LID =
{ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn}, the corresponding public keys
are LPK = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} and data-signature
pairs are 〈data1, σ1〉, 〈data2, σ2〉, . . . , 〈datan, σn〉, re-
spectively. The IoT data center computes R = R1 +
R2 + . . . + Rn, V = V1 + V2 + . . . + Vn and out-
puts 〈R, V 〉 as the aggregated signature σ. To verify
if the aggregate signature σ = (R, V ) on all messages
〈data1, data2, . . . , datan〉 is signed by n terminals with
the same state information ∆, the data center performs
the following steps:
– Compute U = H1(∆ ‖ P0);
– For all 1 6 i 6 n, compute hi = h2(datai ‖ ∆ ‖
IDi), gi = h2(datai ‖ ∆ ‖ Pi);
– Verify e(V, P ) = e(
∑n
i=1 giQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi +
R,U). If the equation holds, output true. Otherwise,
output false.
C. Security Analysis
Theorem 1. The proposed VDAS is existential unforgeable
against the Type I adversaries AI in the random oracle model
assuming the CDHP is hard.
Proof: Let C be a challenger who receives a random instance
(P, aP, bP ) of the CDH problem in (G1,+). Adversary AI
is allowed to ask all oracles maintained by C. We will show
how C interact with AI to compute abP to solve the CDH
problem with a non-negligible probability.
Setup: Firstly, C sets P0 = aP and sends Param =
{G1, G2, e, q, P, P0,H1, h2} to AI .
Simulation: C operates the hash functions H1 and h2 as two
random oracles. AI can perform the following different types
of queries in an adaptive manner. C needs to maintain several
lists generated by H1 and h2, which are initially empty.
Register-query: Here, C selects a j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and AI
can make Register-query on any IDi. C selects xi, yi ∈R Z
∗
q
randomly, where yi is not in the list LR. If i 6= j, C computes
Qi = yiP , Pi = xiP , Di = yiP0; Otherwise, C randomly
chooses a Qj = bP ∈ G1, and set Dj = ”unknown”, Pj =
xjP . Finally, C adds the relevant information to the list LR
and returns Qi and Pi to AI .
Partial-Private-Key-query: AI can ask questions on any
IDi. If i 6= j, C searches the list LR for the relevant
information on IDi, and returns Di to AI . Otherwise, C
aborts.
Public-Key-Replace-query: AI can make this query on
〈IDi, P
′
i 〉, C checks the list LR, replacing 〈Pi, xi, yi〉 with
〈P ′i , “unknown”, yi〉.
Secret-Value-query: AI can query on any IDi. If the
corresponding xi 6= “unknown” is in the list LR, C returns
xi to AI ; Otherwise, it outputs “unknown”.
H1-query: AI can query on 〈∆i, P0〉. C selects λi ∈R Z
∗
q ,
which is not in the list LH1 . Then, it sets Ui = λiP −P0, and
sends it to AI . Finally, 〈∆i, Ui, λi〉 will be added to the list
LH1 .
h2-query: AI can make this query on any (0, 1)
∗, C selects
hi or gi ∈R Z
∗
q , which is in the list Lh2 . Then, it returns hi
or gi to AI and adds the relevant information to the list Lh2 .
Individual-Signing-query: when AI asks for signing on any
〈datai,∆i, IDi, Pi〉, C performs as follows:
(1) Select ri, hi, gi ∈R Z
∗
q randomly, while hi and gi are
not in the list Lh2 .
(2) Compute Ri = riP + giQi − hiPi.
(3) Search Ui = λiP − P0 in LH1 and compute Vi =
λigiQi + riλiP − riP0.
C adds all above information to the corresponding list and
returns 〈Ri, Vi〉 to AI . 〈Ri, Vi〉 could be easily proven to be
valid, since
e(giQi, P0)e(hiPi +Ri, Ui)
= e(giQi, P0)e(riP + giQi, λiP − P0)
= e(λiriP + λigiQi, P )e(riP,−P0)
= e(λigiQi + riλiP − riP0, P )
= e(Vi, P )
Forgery: Finally, AI returns a forged aggregate signature
σ = (R, V ) on messages 〈data1, data2, . . . , datan〉, which
is generated by n terminals whose identities are LID =
{ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn} and corresponding public keys are
LPK = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} with the same state information ∆.
Furthermore, the aggregate signature σ satisfies the following
conditions:
(1) e(V, P ) = e(
∑n
i=1 giQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi +R,U).
(2) There is at least an identify IDk ∈ LID, which has
neither made Partial-Private-Key-query nor Individual-
Signing-query on 〈dataj ,∆, IDj , Pj〉.
TABLE I
TIME CONSUMPTION ON DIFFERENT BASIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS
Operations Multiplication Hash Pairing
Time(ms) 3.629 0.477 4.359
TABLE II
TIME CONSUMPTION ON INDIVIDUAL SIGNING
Schemes Time consumption (ms)
ZQWZ[18] 19.685
CWZY[19] 15.576
CSZ[20] 10.983
DHW[21] 15.597
CTMHH[22] 15.576
VDAS 11.371
From the Forking lemma [27], if C has a replay with the same
random tape but a different respond of h2, AI will output a
new effective forged signature σ′ = 〈R, V ′〉. In this process,
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. If i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}\{k}, we always have
gi = g
′
i; otherwise, if i = k, we have gk 6= g
′
k. Hence, the
following two equations hold:{
e(V, P ) = e(
∑n
i=1 giQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi + R,U)
e(V ′, P ) = e(
∑n
i=1 g
′
iQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi +R,U)
If IDk = IDj , then Qk = Qj = bP . C can output abP
as a solution to the CDH instance by computing abP =
(gs − g
′
s)
−1(Vs − V
′
s ) according to the above two equations.
Otherwise, C aborts.
Theorem 2. The proposed VDAS is existential unforgeable
against the Type II adversaries AII in the random oracle
model assuming the CDHP is hard.
Proof: This security property also relies on the hardness of
CDHP. It can be deduced similarly as the security proof of
Theorem 1. Due to the page limitation, we omit the proof in
detail.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of different
schemes from a computational point of view and then we
closely analyze the computation comparison between our
scheme and the existing schemes [18], [19], [20], [21], [22].
For the experimental evaluation, we set up a simulation envi-
ronment to measure the computing time of the aforementioned
schemes, particularly the computing time for the Individual
Signing phase and the Aggregate verification phase. The details
are as follows:
(1) Environment setup: The simulation environment is set
up in Ubuntu 12.04 with an Intel(R) Pentium G630 2.70GHz
processor and 4096MB memory. Each scheme will be run 100
times in order to compensate for the randomness of the results.
TABLE III
COMPLEXITY COMPARISON BETWEEN DIFFERENT SCHEMES
Schemes Signing Aggregate verification Size
ZQWZ[18] 5S + 3H 5P + 2nS + (2n + 3)H 2L
CWZY[19] 4S + 2H 4P + 2nS + (n+ 2)H (n+ 1)L
CSZ[20] 3S (n+ 1)P + 2nS + nH (n+ 1)L
DHW[21] 4S + 2H 4P + 2nS + (n+ 2)H 2L
CTMHH[22] 4S + 2H 4P + 2nS + 2nH 2L
VDAS 3S + 1H 3P + 2nS + (n+ 1)H 2L
(2) Simulation: In the simulation procedure, the computation
overhead is primarily caused by several kinds of cryptographic
operations. In order to provide a brief estimation for the subse-
quent performance assessment, we mainly focus on the com-
putation overhead of primary cryptographic processing. Firstly,
we list the running time of several fundamental cryptographic
operations in Table I, such as the scalar multiplication in G1,
the pairing operation and the hash operation, which occupy
a major computation overhead in all six selected schemes.
Table II shows the time consumption in individual signing
phase. Table III indicates the complexity comparison among
different schemes. Here, “P ” denotes a pairing operation, “S”
denotes a scalar multiplication in G1, “L” denotes the size
of the elements in G1, and “H” denotes a hash operation
{0, 1}∗ → G1. In the individual signing phase, the proposed
VDAS involves only three scalar multiplications and one
hash operation, while in the aggregate verification phase, it
requires an increasing computation overhead with the number
of IoT terminals. Table III shows that, except of the schemes
in [19], [20], the other four schemes have the fixed length
of aggregated authentication message—2L. In the following
part, more detailed results will indicate the trend of the total
computation overheads with different user scale in the selected
schemes.
Given the brief cryptographic operations and their corre-
sponding time consumption, we can conveniently calculate the
computation time in the “individual signing” phase and the
“aggregate verification” phase respectively. Fig. 4 shows that
CSZ[20] and VDAS achieve the better performance than the
other selected schemes [18], [19], [21], [22] in the individual
signing phase, and VDAS just needs a little bit more time than
CSZ[20]. However, CSZ[20] is very sensitive to the number
of IoT terminals in the aggregate verification phase. In spite of
the good performance when n ≤ 5, its computation overhead
will sharply increase with the number of terminals, as shown
in Fig. 5(b). When n > 5, CSZ[20] will spend much more
time than the other schemes. In Fig. 5(b), we also find that
VDAS requires relatively less computation overhead than the
other five selected schemes on aggregate verification. In IoT
scenarios, the terminal devices are often energy-limited and
computation-constrained while the IoT data center has heavy
computation burden. Therefore, from the simulation results,
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the proposed VDAS achieves a more reasonable trade-off
between the two kinds of IoT entities. It is more efficient and
suitable for practical IoT applications.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on an improved CL-AS algorithm, we put forward an
efficient verifiable data aggregation scheme for IoT scenarios,
named VDAS, which effectively reduces the computation
overhead in IoT data center. The scheme is proved secure
against existential forgery under adaptively chosen messages
attacks, and the security is tightly related to Computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in the random oracle model.
Moreover, the size of aggregated authentication message is
only two group elements, independent of the number of IoT
terminals. The terminals perform individual signing operations
in a non-interactive manner, using only their own secure
information and public information of the system, which
allows a legitimate terminal to dynamically participate in
the verifiable data aggregate processing. Additionally, the
proposed VDAS achieves a better trade-off on the computation
overheads between the resource-constrained IoT terminals
and the data center. The proposed VDAS is more suitable
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Fig. 5. Performance comparison between different schemes
for the data authentication in the resource-constrained IoT
environment such as the wireless sensor network, health-care
system, VANETs data aggregation and so on.
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